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"Dreadful Scenes
of Carnage on Both Sides"
The Strangford Files and the Eastern Crisis
of 1821-1822
THEOPHILUS

C.

PROUSIS

Lord Strangford, an experienced diplomatic official with previous postings to Portugal, Brazil, and Sweden, served as Britain's ambassador to
the Sublime Porte from 1821 to 1824, an especially turbulent time in
Ottoman-European encounters. As the Ottoman Empire coped with a
series of challenges, Strangford sent hundreds of reports to the London
Foreign Office. His correspondence detailed the state of the sultan's
realm at a tense but pivotal moment in the Eastern Question, that precarious web of European power, rivalry, and intrigue in the remarkably
resilient Ottoman Empire, which still possessed strategic lands and
vital waterways in the Levant, or eastern Mediterranean. Rebellion broke
out in the Danubian principalities, the Peloponnese, and other Greekinhabited regions of the Ottoman Empire. War between Russia and
Turkey loomed, largely over Ottoman actions that abrogated RussianOttoman treaties. Ottoman restrictions disrupted European trade. Politics clashed with religion. Sectarian abuse and violence deepened the
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(reprinted

with permission from the Trustees of the British Museum)

Greek-Ottoman divide. Administrative disorder heightened public uncertainty, government factions contested the sultan's rule, and border
disputes sparked hostility between Turkey and Persia.
The virtually untapped Strangford treasure trove, located in the
National Archives, Kew, UK, provides an invaluable resource on Ottoman domestic and foreign affairs, European interests in the Near East,
and Greek stirrings for national independence. The Strangford files,
much like the Dashkov papers in Russian archives, hold potential riches
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for scholars working in Ottoman, Mediterranean, borderlands, andespecially Eastern Question history. 1 Against the backdrop of an intensifying crisis in the Near East, Strangford chronicled a volatile situation
from Constantinople, the epicenter of the upheaval. The messy realities
at the core of this unfolding cataclysm featured the escalating cycle of
Greek-Ottoman fighting and reprisal; the Ottoman massacre of Greek
residents on Chios; the discord among Greek rebels; the debates among
Ottoman officials about military and administrative reform; and the
dogged efforts of European envoys like Strangford to pacify the Greek
uprising and reduce Russian-Ottoman tension. 2 Britain's ambassador
probed all these ramifications, along with the predictable matter of
British trade in the troubled Levant. His communiques also recounted
his persistent attempts to persuade the Porte to evacuate Ottoman
troops from the Danubian principalities, to appoint new hospodars or
governors, and to remove Ottoman impediments against Black Sea and
Mediterranean shipping.
Strangford's description of these topics sharpens our view of the
complex nature of the Eastern Question in the early nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire faced internal and external pressures
spawned by war, revolt, administrative breakdown, and European
intervention. Archives and manuscripts like the Strangford collection
widen our approach to the Eastern Question, from a purely great-power
military, naval, and diplomatic rivalry to a more varied and dynamic
contest. European strategic, commercial, religious, and other objectives
entwined with the unpredictable circumstances of the Ottoman Empire.
By relating specific episodes of janissary unrest, Greek sedition, economic
dislocation, and public insecurity, the writings of Strangford elucidate
not just the overlapping problems at the crux of the Eastern Question
but also the human element at the grassroots, institutional, and policymaking levels of Ottoman society. Rich in texture and detail, these snapshots depict commercial disruption, sectarian strife, administrative
disorder, and foreign meddling in the embattled Ottoman East.
The Greek revolution, which erupted in the Danubian principalities
and spread to the Morea, Attica, Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Aegean
Archipelago, triggered an Eastern emergency with European-wide
repercussions. The established order of legitimacy confronted the principles of liberty and nationality, and the unrest morphed into the prolonged Greek conflict. 3 This struggle drained Ottoman resources and
revenues; stoked dissension among factionalized Greeks; provoked
outside intervention that resulted in an independent Greek kingdom;
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and inspired incendiary outbursts in Europe, Russia, and the Balkans.
The Greek uprising also eventually led the Porte to accelerate its program
of centralizing reforms for the purpose of modernizing the empire. 4
Already in the opening months of the disturbance, European envoys
and consuls had to cope with the seemingly intractable realities of the
Eastern quandary: the flare-up of sectarian strife, the dislocation of trade,
the upsurge in piracy, and the risk of war between Russia and Turkey,
especially after the Russian legation severed official ties with the Porte
and left Constantinople in the summer of 1821.
In taking measures to crush the Greek mutiny, the Porte infringed
on specific articles in Russian-Ottoman treaties and thus antagonized
official relations between the two empires. Reprisals against the Greeks,
most notably the execution of Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V in April
1821, breached the Porte's promise in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji
(1774) to shelter the faith and churches of Ottoman Orthodox Christians.5 Trade obstacles seemingly contravened Russia's right of unimpeded merchant navigation in the straits, guaranteed by Kuchuk
Kainardji and the Treaty of Commerce (1783). The Porte's dismissal of
the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, accusing them of abetting the
agitation, undermined the sultan's imperial decree of 1802, and subsequent stipulations in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), sanctioning Russian
consent in the appointment and deposition of hospodars. Facing strong
public clamor for intervention on behalf of persecuted Greeks, and
despite urgent calls by high-ranking officials for military action to rectify
broken treaties, Alexander I upheld the order of legitimacy. The tsar
deplored the rebellion as a menace to Europe's peace and security and
to the principles of monarchical solidarity and political stability; he also
advocated the Porte's swift suppression of the disorders before they
engulfed other regions. At the same time, the tsarist regime requested
the strict observance of treaties, intent on using them as instruments for
exerting pressure on Turkey.
The Foreign Ministry's dual approach of censuring the revolt but
insisting on complete compliance with treaty accords became the basis
for Russian policy in 1821. Russia's ambassador in Constantinople,
Grigorii Aleksandrovich Stroganov, rebuked the insurrection but remonstrated for Orthodox brethren, protested violations of trade clauses,
and counseled moderation and restraint in Ottoman treatment of noninsurgent Greek Christians. 6 For a host of reasons, however, the Porte
strongly suspected Russian complicity in the turmoil: Russi,a's past
wars against Turkey; its self-proclaimed guardianship of Orthodox
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Christians under Ottoman rule; its generous support of Greek migration to southern Russia, in particular the distribution of land grants and
tax exemptions to Greek settlements in recently annexed Ottoman territories; and its extensive network of Greek proteges in Black Sea and
Aegean commerce. Furthermore, Greek merchants in Odessa participated in the national ferment that produced the Philiki Etaireia (Society
of Friends), the secret society that launched the insurgence of 1821.
Founded in Odessa (1814) and headquartered in Kishinev, this conspiratorial organization recruited members and monies from Greek centers
in Russia and came under the leadership of Alexander Ypsilanti, a
Greek general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp of the tsar.
Also, Russia refused to extradite rebels who fled to Bessarabia, in particular the hospodar of Moldavia, Michael Soutso, who joined the Philiki
Etaireia and took part in the Ypsilanti upheavaV Treaty provisos
crumbled not just because of the\rorte's plausible, but mistaken, accusations of the Russian governmeht!s entanglement in the subversion
but also because of the outbreak of sectarian rage in Constantinople,
Smyrna, and elsewhere. Ironically, treaties that sought to maintain
cordial ties between Russia and Turkey and safeguard Russian activities
in the Near East did neither.
In an ultimatum delivered to the Porte on 6/18 July 1821, Russia
demanded the evacuation of Ottoman troops from the Danubian principalities, the restoration of damaged churches and religious properties,
the protection of Orthodox Christians, and the guarantee of commercial
rights. H the sultan did not accept these terms, Russia would have to offer
asylum and assistance to all Christians subjected to "blind fanaticism." 8
The expiration of the Russian note's prescribed eight-day deadline
without the Porte's full compliance, followed by Ambassador Stroganov's
departure from the Ottoman capital, severed official relations between
Russia and Turkey, the two realms most profoundly affected by the
uproar of 1821. Thus began a strange twilight period of no war yet no
peace. Alexander I proved reluctant to act unilaterally without the sanction of the Concert ofEurope and dreaded the prospect of a RussianTurkish clash that would disrupt the status quo, incite revolts elsewhere,
and jeopardize the balance of power in Europe. Firmly committed to
the Concert of Europe, the tsar suspected that a Jacobin directing committee in Paris had instigated trouble in the Balkans. Yet the Eastern
quagmire thickened, Greek-Ottoman fighting intensified, RussianOttoman affairs festered, and treaty vows shattered amid war and.
revolution in the Levant.
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Britain remained neutral in the Greek-Ottoman feud of 1821 yet
pursued its own strategic, political, and commercial ends. Above all,
Foreign Secretary Castlereagh resolved to avert war between Russia
and Turkey, to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against the
perceived peril of Russian expansion, to extend British trade in the
Levant, and to safeguard Britain's protectorate over the Ionian Islands. 9
All these objectives framed Lord Strangford's responses to the Eastern
predicament. Despite his considerable skill, finesse, and energy in
striving to calm Russian-Ottoman antagonism and to mollify the Greek
havoc, he remains a controversial figure. As the chief representative of
British policy in the Near East, he chided Stroganov for his harsh tone
toward the Porte and falsely implicated several tsarist officials, including
Russia's ambassador, in the subversive Philiki Etaireia. Yet Strangford
worked tirelessly with his European and Ottoman counterparts to
neutralize a dangerous situation, to shield Orthodox Christians, and to
reestablish tranquility in Moldavia and Wallachia. He became convinced
that the Porte's timely restoration of order, most notably the safekeeping
of sacred shrines and the evacuation of troops from the Danubian principalities, would forestall Russian-Ottoman hostilities. Through steadfast
negotiation, Strangford and his colleagues sought to prevent a greatpower war and to defuse the Greek insurgency. 10
Along with his foreboding of a Russian-Ottoman confrontation,
Strangford registered concern over the impending danger of anti-Greek
reprisals-what he termed "atrocious and sanguinary proceedings"
and "a spirit of relentless fanaticism." Attacks against Greek Christian
property and churches became all too palpable to the British envoy,
who bemoaned "the prolongation of that system of sanguinary persecution."11 Violent incidents heightened the mood of disquiet and trepidation in Constantinople, especially at European embassies, obviously
caught off guard when the sultan ordered the execution of Constantine
Mourousi, an Ottoman Greek who served as grand dragoman (interpreter or translator) of the Porte. The death of the ecumenical patriarch
and other church hierarchs amplified the perceived sectarian character
of the Greek-Ottoman collision. 12 Strangford's dispatches portrayed an
escalating Eastern flash point, fueled largely by the danger of partisan
slaughter in the capital and other embattled areas. With indelible images
and scenes, his writing evoked the religious wrath and nationalistic
ferocity that prolonged, as well as exemplified, the Greek-Ottoman
fight. Random and deliberate violence, retribution and excess, by both
Greeks and Turks, took place in Moldavia, Constantinople, Smyrna,
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Aivali, and Tripolitsa. A progression of retaliation and vengeance
exacerbated the Eastern emergency, magnified the human cost of the
conflict, and made diplomatic mediation all the more difficult and
imperative.
Perhaps the most infamous of these outrages occurred on the island
of Chios. The Chios catastrophe epitomized both the folly and the fury
of the Greek revolution, eliciting horrific reminders of fire and sword
memorialized in Eugene Delacroix's edgy Massacre at Chios (1824t the
expressive painting that inspired European sympathy and support for
the Greek cause. Located only five miles from the Turkish mainland,
Ottoman Chios enjoyed relative autonomy, prospered economically,
and blossomed into a commercial hub, perhaps the richest island in the
Aegean, perfectly situated along the main shipping routes in the Levant.
Renowned for its physical beauty, mild climate, fertile soil, and resourceful population, and supposedly the birthplace of Homer, Chios featured
merchant-funded schools and hospitals and a printing press that produced new editions of the ancient Greek classics. When a band of misguided adventurers from nearby Samos landed in March 1822 and
raised the flag of liberation, most Chiotes remained skeptical; they
understandably feared that Samiote foolhardiness and bravado might
jeopardize their coveted autonomy and prosperity. Cautious Chiotes
·questioned the prospect of successful rebellion, given their island's
proximity to Turkey and its distance from the main Greek naval base at
Hydra. Fears became reality when the Ottoman navy approached in
April1822. The Samiote "liberators" fled to the mountains or to their
awaiting boats, leaving Chios to a bitter fate of plunder, savagery, and
slavery. Ottoman regular and irregular forces exacted a terribly high
price in retribution, looting and burning the island, slaughtering unarmed residents, and enslaving thousands. Massacre, captivity, and
flight greatly diminished the island's Greek population, from nearly
12o,ooo to some 2o,oooP
Throughout these mounting pressures during the opening two years
of the crisis, Strangford counseled restraint and caution. He rebuffed
Ottoman complaints that the tsarist regime stood behind the Ypsilanti
expedition. He advised the Porte to put its trust in the tsar's revulsion
of revolution. He protested the execution of the patriarch. And he repeatedly tried to assuage the anger and resentment that incited further
atrocities by the belligerents. Far from disloyal to Stroganov, he echoed
his Russian colleague on several crucial issues yet criticized his provocative demeanor,and language, such as Stroganov's sweeping assertion
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that Russia had the right not just to protect the sultan's Christian subjects
but to denounce the Ottoman Empire's existence as "incompatible with
the stability and security of the Christian faith." 14 Although Strangford
did not succeed in thwarting a rupture in Russian-Ottoman relations,
he exhorted the Porte to observe the strict letter of existing treatiesby withdrawing Ottoman troops from the Danubian principalities,
by repairing damaged churches, and by protecting Greek Orthodox
subjects.
The narratives of Strangford reflect the advantages and limitations
of primary sources written by Europeans in the Ottoman Islamic world
in the early nineteenth century. Their commentaries conveyed conventional Western views of the Ottoman Empire, perceptions that
stigmatized the Ottoman other with occasional distortion, bias, and exaggeration. Envoys and consuls-and not just British representativesdepicted Ottoman officialdom in a mostly negative light, accenting
episodes of oppression and abuse by pashas, janissaries, and customs
officers. Many of these authorities, portrayed as rapacious, corrupt, and
arbitrary, interfered in the administration of European diplomatic and
commercial concessions-the capitulations-and thus complicated
European-Ottoman interactions. Through their anecdotes and choice
of words, Western records alluded to commonly accepted European
images of the Ottoman Empire, fast approaching what became known
as "the sick man of Europe" in Western political discourse and popular
opinion. 15
Yet the dispatches excerpted here elucidate some of the essential
benefits of Western firsthand testimony on the Eastern Question. Strangford relied on a circle of sources, gathering intelligence from merchants,
travelers, proteges, consuls, and dragomans; from high-ranking as well
as regional Ottoman officials; and from other European envoys. Sifting
through these different accounts, the ambassador chronicled what he
deemed the most critical realities in Constantinople, the geopolitical
heart of the Ottoman Empire, and addressed a range of topics beyond
the political and diplomatic facets of the Eastern crisis. Moreover, given
Strangford's access to highly placed authorities. in the central government and their protracted deliberations, his correspondence sheds light
on how Ottoman officialdom perceived and reacted to the Greek sedition. The very specificity and urgency of his reports deepen our understanding of the multiple issues, such as sectarian friction and religiously
tinged Russian-Ottoman tension, which marked an age of upheaval in
the Ottoman Levant.
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Documents
These passages introduce readers to the various concerns that not only
preoccupied Strangford but characterized Eastern Question diplomacy
during the Eastern crisis. Document 1 suggests the intrigue and duplicity
that accompanied European dealings with Ottoman court favorites and
influential advisers of the sultan. Selections 2 and 3 highlight the crux
of Strangford's overarching task: to defuse Russian-Ottoman tension
and avoid war between Russia and Turkey. Documents 4, 7, 8, and 10
demonstrate the prominence of commerce in Eastern Question negotiations during this troubled period, especially in view of the disruption
of trade caused by the Greek revolt. Selections 5 and 9 deal with the
Chios massacre, while document 6 focuses on the festering problem of
orderly governance in the Danubian principalities. All these sources
are located in the Foreign Office holdings of the National Archives,
Kew (TNA F0). 16 When the manuscript has a word or phrase underlined for emphasis, I have retained the original format. In most matters
of wording, grammar, punctuation, and citation of numbers, I have
retained Strangford's format, including his archaisms and inconsistent
spellings. All explanatory material in brackets is mine.
1.

TNA FO

78/106, FF. 14-16,

10 JANUARY 1822

(No. 3) (SECRET)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the possibility of influencing Halet
Efendi, the main adviser and close confidante of Sultan Mahmud II, by
a bribe.]l 7
Among the means which have occurred to my colleagues and to
me, as likely to influence the Turkish policy in the present crisis, the
employment of a sum of money has more than once been under
consideration.
That Halet Efendi, the sultan's sole favourite and principal adviser,
is accessible to corruption, is as certain as that his power over his
imperial master is unbounded. A negotiation of this nature (supposing
it to be previously authorized by Your Lordship) would of course
require the utmost delicacy and circumspection. But it does not appear
to be impracticable, or unlikely to be successful.
The fear of the janissaries is (confidentially) admitted by the Turkish
government as a chief reason for their delay in completely evacuating
the Principalities and in nominating the hospodars.
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On this ground, the offer of money might be made to Halet Efendi.
He might be told, that immediately on orders being given for the
removal of the troops, and on the publication of a decree appointing
the hospodars, a sum would be secretly placed in his hands, to be applied,
at his sole discretion, to the purpose of quieting any opposition or
discontent which those measures might excite among the janissaries.
Halet Efendi is too wealthy to be tempted by an inconsiderable
offer. Perhaps one thousand purses, or between twelve and thirteen
thousand pounds sterling, though in itself, a large sum, would not be
considered by the allied cabinets as bearing any proportion to the
expenditure of treasure which a war between Russia and Turkey
might hereafter impose upon the governments of Europe.

2. TNA F078/lo6, FF. 204-12A,
25 FEBRUARY 1822 (No. 27)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British ambassador's conference
with Ottoman ministers on the demands submitted to the Porte by the
tsarist regime.}
My conference with the Turkish ministers took place at the house of
the reis efendi [Ottoman foreign minister} on Saturday the 16th instant.
It was originally intended by the Porte that this meeting should be
of a private and confidential character; but in consideration of the
important interests which it involved, I requested the Turkish ministers
to consent that it should be conducted in the most formal and official
way ....
Your Lordship will perceive that in the absence of any late instructions
from His Majesty's government, I regulated my language according to
the more recent intelligence which my colleagues had received from
their respective courts, founded upon their knowledge of the intentions
of Russia in case the Porte should not accede to her demands with regard
to the Principalities.
The intelligence thus received, left no room to doubt that a further
resistance to the Russian demands would be followed by war; and that
the month of March would be the term of the emperor's forbearance.
On this point my conference principally turned -peace, and the
active good offices of the allies for the future, in case the Divan should
accede to the Russian propositions-war, and the cessation of all
friendly intervention on the part of the allies if it should refuse, or
delay to admit them.
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In placing this alternative before the Turkish ministers, with all
possible frankness, though at the same time, with all the conciliatory
forms of friendship, I could hardly avoid making use of language
which I fully expected would have been ill-received by Ottoman pride.
But I was completely mistaken. Everything which I uttered was
placed to its true account; the friendly part which England was acting,
seemed to be thoroughly and gratefully felt; and on no previous occasion
did I ever experience such marked attention -such perfect amenityand such invincible, I might say, such provoking good humour. It was
difficult to avoid entertaining a suspicion that they had already made
up their mind to grant what I demanded -that they were resolved
to keep this determination a secret-and that they were amusing
themselves with the anxiety and agitation under which they saw me
evidently labouring.
There were none of those offensive allusions, upon this occasion,
with which the language of the Turkish ministers formerly aboundedand no insolent reference was made to the union of the Koran and the
sabre, or to the irresistible might of an Empire armed in defence of its
religion.
The result of the conference may be summed in a very few words.
The Russian demands were admitted in the most unequivocal manner,
and a solemn promise to execute them with the least possible delay,
was given, together with a declaration that the Divan was seriously
occupied in actually carrying them into effect. But no positive term for
the accomplishment of this engagement was appointed.
Were we to judge merely from the text of those assurances, it would
certainly seem that little real progress had been made in the negotiation.
But I cannot avoid thinking that I have gained much more than appears.
on the face of the protocol. To say nothing of the tone and manner of
the Ottoman ministers, and of the various favourable il.cdications which
they presented, it is quite impossible for me to suppose that such
language as that which was held to them, in the name of the king of
England, can be altogether without effect. The confidence which this
government places ill His Majesty, and ill the friendship of Great Britain,
is certainly greater than that which it is disposed to shew towards any
other of the allies; and I have every reason to hope that such full credit
is given to us for the disinterestedness of our advice, as will ensure its
being finally and speedily accepted.
But I have other grounds on which to found these hopes. Private
assurances have been repeatedly sent to me, since the day of my
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conference, by some of the ministers with whom I am in more
confidential relations (particularly by the kapudan pasha [grand admiral
of the Ottoman navy]), that all matters would be settled to my
satisfaction-but that I must allow the government to do things in
its own way.

J. TNA FO 78/lo6, FF. 252-55,
25 FEBRUARY 1822 (N 0. 29)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the issue of direct negotiations between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire.]
Your Lordship will perceive from the report of my last conference,
that there is no immediate hope of inducing the Porte to accede to the
very desirable proposition of opening a direct negotiation with Russia.
The unconquerable feeling of Turkish pride will stand in the way of
such an arrangement, and the pretence, that, as they were not the first
to break the ordinary relations between the two governments, they
are not called upon to be the first to renew them, will, I apprehend,
be obstinately adhered to. At all times, the reluctance of the Turks
to engage in negotiation at a distance from the seat of their own
government, has been notorious, and I do not imagine that there is
anything in the present question, which will induce them to relinquish
that system of habitual distrust which characterizes them.
If the virtual admission of most of the demands of Russia (which we
may consider as having already taken place), and the fair and honest
execution of those which yet remain to be fulfilled, should be considered
by the emperor of Russia as sufficiently re-establishing the state of
things which existed previously to the departure of his minister, it is
only to His Imperial Majesty's magnanimity that we can look for the
renewal of the direct official intercourse between the two governments.
I should deceive Your Lordship were I to indicate the slightest hope
that the first step towards it, would be taken by the Porte. But I think
that in still further satisfaction of His Imperial Majesty's dignity, it
would not be found impossible to procure fro:rn the Porte, if not a
positive request, at all events, the expression of a strong wish that a
Russian minister should be sent to Constantinople. The principal
difficulty in the way of a negotiation to obtain such a declaration from
the Porte, would be the individual exception with which they would
most probably seek to accompany it, and which would (perhaps with
reason) be considered as offensive to the emperor's dignity.
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This government has certainly manifested oflate, a wish to have it
generally understood that it was on the point of renewing its official
relations with Russia, and the language now held upon this subject is
very different from that which prevailed some time ago. There is a
very wealthy and respectable corporation of Turkish merchants ...
who trade with the Black Sea. These persons presented a memorial to
the Porte on the 21st instant, respecting a valuable ship belonging to
them, which the crew, composed of Greeks, had carried into Odessa,
and sold to a Russian merchant there, at the beginning of the rebellion.
The kiahya bey [Ottoman minister of the interior] told them, in reply,
to have a little patience, and that as soon as matters were settled
with Russia, their ship would undoubtedly be restored to them. This
assurance not appearing to satisfy the merchants, Gianib Efendi, who
was present (and who of all the Turkish ministers is the least likely to
make any declaration of a pacific tendency), added -"Matters are
now almost finally adjusted. I pledge myself that in one month, or in
six weeks at furthest, a Russian minister will be here, and the two
governments will be better friends than ever."-The satisfaction with
which this intelligence was received by the public, among whom it
was speedily circulated, must have proved to the Ottoman ministers (if
indeed they could have had any doubt on the subject) the unpopularity
of a Russian war, and the desire of all the wealthy and respectable
classes for the preservation of peace with their mighty neighbour.

4· TNA FO 78/107, FF. 142-44A,
10 APRIL 1822 (No. 47)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the steps taken by the Porte to repress the
abuses of foreign-flagged vessels.]l 8
The Turkish government continues to employ very strict measures
to repress those abuses of foreign flags which have so long prevailed
here, to the great disgrace of such missions as have converted them
into a source of pecuniary profit.
Although the right of the Porte to investigate the nationality of the
ships which enter and depart from this harbour cannot be disputed,
its ignorance of European forms and usages, often leads it into wrong
modes of applying a principle, otherwise perfectly justifiable in itself.
Frequent disputes arise in consequence between the government and
certain of the foreign ministers-and it is to be lamented that some of
the latter should occasionally forget that they are called upon at this
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moment to watch over higher and more important interests, and
should exhaust their time and their temper in paltry squabbles, and in
seeking to defend cases which could not be justified according to any
navigation code in Europe.
The rnissions to which we are indebted for the trouble and vexations
now imposed upon our trade, are those of Naples, Denmark, and
Holland. The charges d'affaires of these courts have long made a public
traffic of their national flags, which became at length so notorious as to
rouse the attention of the Porte, and to induce her to establish a system
of scrutiny, of which the inconveniences are general in their operation
upon all the missions at this residence, even upon those against which
no accusation has ever been urged.
Nor is it only with reference to our commerce and navigation that
we have to complain of the prejudices which the respectable part of the
corps diplomatique now suffer in consequence of the improper behaviour
of the three charges d'affaires already mentioned. The Porte seeks to
retrench many of the immunities which we have enjoyed from time
immemoriat on account of the flagrant abuse of them committed by
some of the individuals whom we are unfortunately compelled to
consider as our colleagues. I allude particularly to the right of importing
wine for the use of our families. This privilege is now a daily subject of
contention with the Porte, owing to the dishonourable conduct of
M. Navoni, the Neapolitan agent, who has made prodigious sums of
money by lending his name to the publicans of Per a, whom he has thus
for several years supplied with liquors, on a fixed and most profitable
percentage. The whole conduct of this man is a perpetual scandaland I speak the sentiments of every mission here, which has the
slightest regard for its own honour, when I say that it is a disgrace to
the court of Naples that such a person should be charged with the
conduct of its affairs, and should be permitted to prostitute the name
of a public minister, in such a shameful manner as we have lately
witnessed.

5· TNA FO 78/107, FF. 227-30,
25 APRIL 1822 (No. 55)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the Ottoman attack on Chios and the
.recapture of that island by the kapudan pasha's fleet.] 19
The Turkish expedition against Chios has been successful.
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We are yet without complete details of this transaction, but from
all that can be collected, it seems to have been productive of dreadful
scenes of carnage on both sides.
On the first appearance of the lcapudan pasha's formidable fleet, the
Greeks who were stationed between Chesme, on the mainland, and
Chios (to prevent the troops assembled at the former place from crossing
over), cut their cables, and effected their escape, leaving Chios to its
fate.
This circumstance enabled six thousand of the Chesme troops to
join the lcapudan pasha, who, on the nth instant proceeded to summon
the insurgents to surrender, offering pardon to all who should lay
down their arms, and giving them eight hours to consider ... his
proposals.
The insurgents rejected this offer-and instantly attempted to carry
the castle by escalade, thinking that they could effect that object, and
secure themselves in the fortress before the lcapudan pasha could have
time to disembark his troops. In this they were mistaken -they were
vigorously repulsed by the garrison, and in the meanwhile, the /capudan
pasha landing about nine thousand men, and the former making a
sortie, they were enclosed between two fires; lost all their artillery,
amounting to twenty pieces, which was speedily turned against them,
and after a short and most bloody resistance, took to flight, and were
pursued in all directions. It is said that the loss on both sides amounts
to fifteen thousand men. No quarter was given after the action. Every
person taken with arms in his hands was instantly put to death. The
women and children have been thrown into slavery. Previously to the
action, and on the first appearance of the fleet, the Catholic inhabitants
had shut themselves up in their convent. They have been protected by
the lcapudan pasha, who has stationed a guard for their security, and
who has received numbers of them on board of his fleet, where they
are treated with the utmost kindness. The Catholic Greeks have, as
Your Lordship is aware, never taken any part in the insurrection, and,
as well at Chios, as in all the other islands, have constantly maintained
their allegiance to the sultan.
The lcapudan pasha has left a considerable body of troops on the island,
who will, I fear, pursue the work of destruction to the very utmost. The
Sarniote Greeks, whose unfortunate expedition to Chios has been the
cause of the calamity which has overwhelmed that once happy and
flourishing island, took no part in the combat, and basely fled to Psara,
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hastily embarking on the side opposite to that where the Turkish
troops landed.
The kapudan pasha is said to have proceeded to the Morea, with the
intention of attacking some of the insurgent islands in his way.
I have the honour to enclose a translation of the placard which
accompanied the exhibition of heads, standards, and other trophies,
sent to the Porte by Vahid Pasha, the governor of Chios.

6. TNA FO 78/1o8, FF. 50-59,
10 MAY 1822 (No. 70)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the nomination of the new hospodars
and the proposed changes in the administration of the Danubian
principalities. ]2°
At the council held on Monday, ... [the] question of nominating the
new princes [hospodars ], and of choosing them from among the native
boyars, was proposed to the ustaas [officers] of the janissaries who
were present, and unanimously approved. The slight offered to the
Greek nation by this selection, has more than any other cause, induced
the janissaries to approve of the nomination of princes being carried
into effect. Had the choice of the government fallen upon Greeks, I am
convinced that the janissaries would have resisted to the very utmost.
In truth, the policy of the Porte seems now to be decided; and its
resolution to reduce the Greek nation to a state of absolute nullity, may
be considered as irrevocably fixed. That imperium in imperio [empire
within an empire, or state within a state] which had made such silent
but rapid progress during the last thirty years, will exist no longer. The
great source of Greek influence, and with it, of that hitherto exercised
by Russia, will now be cut off, by the employment of Turkish subjects
as the future dragomans of the Porte, and by the selection of natives to
govern the two Principalities. Some observations which were lately
made to me on this subject by one of the most intelligent Turks I have
hitherto known, are perhaps not unworthy of Your Lordship's attention.
"What has Russia gained," he asked, "by precipitating the Greek
affair? For that it originated in the hopes held out by her ministers at
St. Petersburg, and her agents in Turkey, no man who has his eyes and
ears, can for a moment doubt. However, praise be to God, that she
acted as she did. But for the conduct of her consuls in the Archipelago,
and the intemperance of her minister here, in hurrying matters to an
extremity, we should have gone on in a false and fatal security. The
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Greeks would have, slowly perhaps, but surely, appropriated to
themselves, the entire government of this Empire. In commerce and
in affairs of state, they were already all powerful, and nobody among
us had begun to suspect the gradual encrease of their influence. Had
this state of things gone on for thirty years more, we should have been
lost. Russia has done us a great service without intending it. She held
a lever in her hands, with which she could at any time, have shaken
this Empire to the foundation. It is now broken. She has (also without
meaning it) rendered us another service. The powers of Europe have
taught her, that she cannot make war upon us under flimsy pretences.
I was in the ministry when the Holy Alliance was proclaimed; and when
all my colleagues were frightened by it, I said, that if the sovereigns of
Europe acted up to their word, the Holy Alliance would, one day, be
our barrier against Russia. If I am not now in the ministry, it is owing
to what I then said, and to the indignation with which it was received.
But I was in the right. Had it not been for that alliance, which has now
proved to Russia that she is but .Qllg, and the other states of Europe are
many, we should have ere now been fighting against Russia for the
possession of Constantinople. This result was not foreseen by Stroganoff
[Stroganov] when he sought to excite his government against us. The
Russian influence here is no more. She will again seek to exert it, under
·pretence of settling the affairs of the Principalities, and of restoring to
them the blessings of peace and good order. But we mean to deprive
her of this pretence. We shall anticipate her, by our new arrangements
for the relief of Wallachia and Moldavia; and when her minister returns
here, he will find that everything is done, and that he has no excuse for
meddling in our affairs."
Your Lordship may depend upon the fidelity with which the above
observations are reported.

. 7· TNA FO 78/108, FF. 167-69A,
10 JUNE 1822 (No. 85)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British embassy's successful resistance
against the Porte's endeavor to search British ships in the harbor of
Constantinople.]
Your Lordship is aware that many of the most essential of our
commercial privileges here, do not depend upon the positive letter
of our treaties with the Porte, but are derived from the stipulations
of those subsisting between Turkey and Russia, inasmuch as the
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arrangement concluded in 1802, placed us upon the footing of the most
favoured nation.
Whatever advantages therefore are accorded to Russia by treaty,
we have a right to claim, even though they should not be specifically
provided for in our own capitulations. 21
Among the new arrangements established by the Porte for the
purpose of preventing the abuses in foreign navigation which have
been detected here, is the practice of causing ships to be visited at the
moment of their departure, by the officers of the Porte, in order to
ascertain whether the cargoes correspond with the manifests.
This new regulation has hitherto been exercised with great severity,
and has been the subject of loud and violent complaints on the part of
the foreign merchants.
By the 55th Article of our capitulations, the right of the Porte to
make this visit or search on board of our ships is clearly admitted. But
on the other hand, in her treaty with Russia, this right is as positively
abrogated, as far as the navigation of that power is concerned.
Conceiving that we are entitled, in virtue of the arrangement of 1802
to every advantage possessed by Russia, I have strenuously resisted
the claim set up by the Porte, to examine our ships, demanding for
them, the same exemption which is accorded to those of Russia.
This attempt on my part was attended with considerable difficulty,
as all the other missions here had yielded to the pretensions of the
Porte, and had admitted her right of searching the ships of their
respective nations.
I will not trouble Your Lordship with the details of a negotiation,
which has occupied me almost incessantly for the last three weeks,
and I confine myself to a communication of its successful result, as
announced in the accompanying official report from my first dragoman
[Francis Chabert].
The British navigation in this port is now placed upon a footing
quite distinct as far as relates to the right of search, from that of any
other nation. I am very unwilling that we should be exposed to the
jealousy likely to arise from this circumstance, but as one of my first
duties here is to assist our commerce, I cannot think that I ought to reject
any exemption from inconvenience which I may be able to procure for
it, from a principle of delicacy, because other missions may not have
succeeded in obtaining it for their respective countries. If it were [a]
question of any positive and exclusive favour to our commerce, I
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certainly should not think it worth being purchased at the price of the
discontent of my colleagues, but as the present arrangement relates
merely to relief from a great and serious inconvenience, I conceive that
I am bound to do all that I can in behalf of my countrymen, without
any tenderness for the jealous feelings of merchants belonging to other
nations.
8. TNA FO 78/108, FF. 261-64,
JUNE 1822 (No. 97).

25

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the reis efendi's confidential proposal on
commercial matters.]
I have the honour to transmit a copy of an unexpected communication
which has been made to me by the reis efendi.
After stating that the restrictive measures which have lately been
adopted by this government with regard to foreign commerce, are
aimed prospectively at Russia, and destined to prevent the navigation
of the Greeks from being carried on almost exclusively under the flag
of that country-and after renewing his promise that the British trade
should continue to be exempted from the effects of the new regulations,
the reis efendi expresses the wish of this government that the commerce
· of its reaya [tax-paying Orthodox Christian] subjects, hitherto conducted
under Russian protection, should be transferred to Great Britain. He
adds to this (sufficiently obscure) proposal, a request that I would
concert with him as to the means of carrying the dispositions of the
Porte into effect, in such a way as to be reciprocally beneficial to England
and to Turkey.
Even were this overture likely to be advantageous to our commerce
and navigation (which it certainly is not), I am persuaded that Your
Lordship would not conceive the present to be a proper moment for
accepting from the Porte any invidious distinction in our favour.
But while I act in conformity to what I presume will be Your
Lordship's opinion, by declining to avail myself of the reis efendi's
proposition, I feel persuaded that I am not sacrificing any real advantage
to the commercial interests of His Majesty's subjects. Their navigation
does not require any new stipulations to support it, for the political
circumstances of this Empire have, of themselves, been sufficient to
place it in a more flourishing condition, and to give it a greater extension
[than] it ever before possessed. The Greek carrying trade is extinct, or
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more properly, the greater part of it is now lodged in our hands or in
those of the Ionians. It seems therefore better to leave matters as they
are, and to suffer our commerce to profit by the natural course of
events, without seeking to foster it by new arrangements between the
two governments.
In this opinion, I have desired M. Chabert to thank the reis efendi for
his communication; adding, however, that it was only valuable to me
as a mark of His Excellency's confidence and of his good-will towards
the nation with whose interests I am charged-but that I did not see
how the proposal which he had made to me, could be turned to the
advantage of either country. I observed, moreover, that discovering in
this overture a sincere proof of his desire to favour our commerce, it
would encourage me, when a proper opportunity occurred, not to
make new demands in behalf of it, but to invite him to define and settle
certain rights (with reference in particular to our Black Sea trade) to
which we had an undoubted claim, but which had either lapsed into
oblivion, or had never hitherto been recognized with sufficient precision
by the Ottoman government.

9· TNA FO

78/108, FF. 303-07,
26 JUNE 1822 (No. 101)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: naval clashes off Chios between Greek
and Ottoman ships.]
The [Austrian] internuncio [Rudolf von Liitzow] having delayed
the departure of the post until this day, I am enabled to have the honour
of reporting to Your Lordship that most unwelcome and disastrous
intelligence has arrived from the Turkish fleet before Chios.
On the night of Wednesday last, the Greeks attacked the kapudan
pasha's vessel (a three-decker) and two other ships of the line, with
their fire ships. The crews of the two smaller vessels of the line succeeded
in extinguishing the flames, but the admiral's ship was blown up, and
the kapudan pasha perished, together with all his officers and crew. The
body of the kapudan pasha was picked up, floating on the sea, and was
interred at Chios on the following day.
I sent M. Chabert to the Porte early this morning, to ascertain from
the reis efendi the truth of this intelligence, a rumour of which had
reached me last night, but in such a vague manner that I did not report
it in my dispatches to Your Lordship. The reis efendi fully confirmed the
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particulars which I have related as above; and though deeply affected
with the disgrace thus brought upon the Ottoman arms, endeavoured
to assume an appearance of the utmost indifference.
The loss of the finest and largest vessel in the Turkish fleet, and of
the only commander of any skill in naval matters whom this government
possessed, must undoubtedly be a cause of the greatest mortification
to the Porte-while it will proportionally augment the audacity of
the Greeks. I dread the exasperating effect which this affair may have
on the public mind at Constantinople and Smyrna, and still more
those measures of barbarous policy to which this government will too
probably have recourse for the sake of calming it. Nor can I look without
apprehension to the unfavourable influence which this disaster may
have on the progress of the negotiation, which I had flattered myself
was so near to a successful tennination.
10. TNA FO 78/110, FF. 18'--25,
3 SEPTEMBER 1822 (No. 145)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: Russia's demand for the retraction of
Ottoman regulations on navigation in the Black Sea.]
It appears that the Russian government has invited the British and
Austrian missions at St. Petersburg to propose to the internuncio and
to me, the employment of our joint efforts for the purpose of procuring
from the Porte the abrogation of the system on which she is now acting
with respect to foreign navigation.
The Russian government, while it admits that these regulations
are justified by the enormous abuses which have been cominitted
here, and that they contain nothing contrary to treaty, discovers in
them, notwithstanding, a clear indication of an unfriendly if not a
decidedly hostile disposition towards Russia, on the part of the Turkish
government.
The regulations of the Porte respect those nations which have not
acquired by treaty the right to navigate in the Black Sea. The Turkish
ministers say that this privilege was granted to those nations who
enjoy it, either in consequence of a war, at the end of which the Porte
yielded it, or of some amicable negotiation at which an equivalent for
it was granted by the other contracting party -that the Porte is ready
to concede the navigation of the Black Sea to those powers who are
willing to negotiate, and to grant a fair compensation for it in some
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shape or other, but that she will not suffer those powers to defraud the
interests of the Porte, by surreptitiously availing themselves of an
advantage for which other states have been content to pay.
This is the principle on which the Porte is now acting. Its attention
to the question of foreign navigation, has been provoked by the
multiplied and scandalous abuses of foreign flags which have prevailed
in the chanceries of the Dutch, Danish, and Neapolitan missionsabuses, which I am obliged to say, have been equally injurious to the
interests of the Porte and disgraceful to the legations which have
practised them.
That Russia in particular has no just ground of complaint against
these regulations, may be inferred both from the fact that since the
departure of her minister, the navigation of bona fide Russian vessels
has been constantly respected, and has never been interrupted, but
also from the indulgence which the Porte, in the very face of those
regulations, has extended to vessels which have no right to be
considered as Russian. In August last, a number of Genoese and
Sardinian vessels arrived here under the Russian flag, with the intention
of proceeding to the Black Sea. Their owners being apprehensive of a
Russian war, changed their flag for that of France, which M. de Viella,
the French charge d'affaires, accorded to them. Under that flag they
accordingly proceeded to the Black Sea; on their return from which,
every one of them, on their arrival at Constantinople, was permitted
by this government to resume the Russian flag, under which they had
originally sailed, and to which they were in point of strict right, as little
entitled as to that of France, or of any other country excepttheir own.
I do not therefore perceive on what ground Russia is (at least for
the present) justified in complaining against the new regulations of the
Porte; nor how I can charge myself with the office of supporting these
complaints.
But there is, moreover, another consideration of which, as long as it
shall be my first duty to watch over British interests, I must not permit
myself to lose sight. The restrictions of the Porte with respect to the
navigation of other countries, have produced such a sudden and
extensive effect in favour of that of Great Britain, and the British shipping
interests in the Levant have been so greatly benefitted by their operation,
and by the exclusion of, what may be termed interlopers, from the trade
of the Black Sea, that I can hardly venture to do anything which may
disturb the progress of these advantages, without Your Lordship's
express commands.
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NOTES

1. I am compiling four volumes of Strangford's dispatches from his
ambassadorship at the Porte (1821-24). Volumes 1 and zhave already appeared:
Theophilus C. Prousis, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821): The Eastern
Crisis (istanbul: Isis Press, 2010); idem, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1822):
The Eastern Crisis (istanbul: Isis Press, 2012). Excerpts from these works can be
found in Theophilus C. Prousis, "Eastern Orthodoxy lmder Siege in the Ottoman
Levant: A View from Constantinople in 1821," Modern Greek Studies Yearbook
24/25 (zooS/ 2009): 39-72; idem, "British Embassy Reports on the Greek Uprising
in 1821-1822: War of Independence or War of Religion?," Archivum Ottomanicum
z8 (zou): 171-222. For biographical information on Strangford (I78o-1855), see
Prousis, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821), 326. On the Dashkov collection in the Russian State Historical Archive, St. Petersburg, and its importance
for studying imperial Russian activities in the Near East, see Theophilus C.
Prousis, Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant: The Dashkov Archive, Minnesota
Mediterranean and East European Monographs, no. 10 (Minneapolis: Modern
Greek Studies Program, University of Minnesota, 2002). Dmitrii V. Dashkov
(1784-1839), an adviser at the tsarist embassy in Constantinople from 1817 to
1823, inspected Russian consulates in the Levant, visited sacred sites on Mount
Athas and in Palestine, and recorded his observations on Greek and Ottoman
affairs in a variety of proposals, memoranda, and dispatches.
2. The Eastern crisis of the 182os forms part of the larger canvas of internal
and external challenges that destabilized and thus restructured the Ottoman
Empire in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See Virginia H.
Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged (Harlow, England: Pearson
Longman, 2007), 180-342; Caroline Finkel, Osman's Dream: The Story of the
Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923 (New York: Basic Books, zoos), 289-446; Suraiya
Faroqhi, ed., The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839 (New York: Cambridge University Press, zoo6); Frederick F.
Anscombe, ed., The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830 (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener,
zoo6); Fikret Adanir and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds., The Ottomans and the Balkans:
A Discussion of Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 2002). European consuls often
described the state of the Ottoman Empire during these unsettled times. See
Theophilus C. Prousis, British Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant in an Age
of Upheaval, 1815-1830 (Istanbul: Isis Press, zooS); G. L. Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie
v Rossii: Osvoboditel'naia bor'ba grecheskogo naroda v nachale XIX v. i russ/wgrecheskie sviazi (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); 29-76; Eleutherios Prevelakis and Kallia
Kalliataki Mertikopoulou, eds., Epirus, Ali Pasha, and the Greek Revolution: Consular Reports of William Meyer from Preveza, 2 vols., Monuments of Greek History,
no. 12 (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1996).
3· On the Greek revolution, see Aksan, Ottoman Wars, z85-305; David
Brewer, The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from Ottoman
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Oppression and the Birth of the Modern Greek Nation (Woodstock, NY: Overlook
Press, 2003); Petros Pizanias, ed., The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event
(Istanbul: Isis Press, 2011); Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence,
1821-1833 (London: Batsford, 1973). For a recent Russian perspective on the
Greek awakening, based largely on Russian and Greek sources, see Olga E.
Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII-XX vv.: Ocherlci politicheskogo
razvitiia (Moscow: KDY, 2010), 100-222. The Greek revolt exerted a profound
impact on great-power politics and diplomacy in the Near East. For this European, including Russian, perspective on the Eastern quagmire of the 182os, see
M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966),
1-77; Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), 614-21, 637-64; idem, Mettemich's Diplomacy at Its
Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), 164-94, 223-25;
A. V. Fadeev, Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 2o-kh godov XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka,
1958); G. L. Arsh and V. N. Vinogradov, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na Balkanakh
1815-1830 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), 127-295.
4· With the benefit of Ottoman archives, several scholars have examined
the effect of the Greek uprising on Ottoman reforms of administrative and
military institutions and on the ruling hierarchy's exposure to such secular
concepts as nation, citizen, liberty, and national independence. See the studies
by Hakan Erdem: '"Do Not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers':
Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence," in Citizenship and the
Nation-State in Greece and Turkey, ed. Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas (New
York: Routledge, 2005), 67-84; idem, "The Greek Revolt and the End of the Old
Ottoman Order," in Pizanias, Greek Revolution of 1821, 257-64. Also see Nikos
Theotokas and Nikos Kotaridis, "Ottoman Perceptions of the Greek Revolution," in Pizanias, Greek Revolution of 1821, 265-73; Vitalii Sheremet, "The Greek
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Wars, 157-60; Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in World
Politics: A Documentary Record, 2nd rev. ed., 2 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale
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Press, 1990), 29-59. On the treaty's impact on the Greek national awakening,
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2004), 445-66.
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on behalf of Greek coreligionists, see Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian Society and
the Greek Revolution (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 26-30,
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XVII-XX vv.: Sbornik statei (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia RAN, 1999); Iu.
D. Priakhin, Gre/d v istorii Rossii XVIII-XIX velcov: Istoricheskie ocherki (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2008); I. Nikolopulos, Greki i Rossiia XVII-XX vv.: Sbomik statei
(St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2007). Precisely because of these deep-seated RussianGreek ties, the Ottoman government suspected Russia's direct involvement in
the Greek agitation.
8. The tsarist ultimatum of 6/18 July 1821 appears in print in Ministerstvo
inostrannykh del SSSR, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX v.: Dolwmenty
Rossiislcogo ministerstva inostrannykh del, 17 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1960-2005),
12 (1980):203-10. The old-style Julian calendar, used in Russia until1918, lagged
twelve days behind the new-style Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century.
9· On British policy under Foreign Secretary Castlereagh toward the Greek
insurgence and the larger Eastern crisis in 1821-22, see Charles Webster, The
Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the European Alliance, 2nd ed.
(London: G. Bell, 1934), 349-86; Charles W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930; repr., New York: H. Fertig, 1973), 17-42; V. N.
Vinogradov, Velilcobritaniia i Balkany: Ot Venskogo lcongressa do Krymskoi voiny
(Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 31-55, for a Russian view of Castlereagh's policy.
10. On Strangford's efforts at the Porte, see the essay by Allan Cunningham
("Lord Strangford and the Greek Revolt") in Allan Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman
Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays, ed. Edward Ingram (London:
Frank Cass, 1993), 188-232; Radu R Florescu, The Struggle against Russia in the
Romanian Principalities: A Problem in Anglo-Turkish Diplomacy, 1821-1854 (Ia§i:
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